TWENTY years ago.....a prospect for peace in the Middle East....after decades of conflict between Palestinians and Israelis.
This two-part film tells the story ...of secret negotiations... ...in the political shadows.
A story of the search for common ground... ....in the midst of a region in constant turmoil.
And at the centre of it all... An unlikely mediator... ....the Scandinavian country of Norway. Ladies and gentlemen, his Excellency Johan Holst minister of foreign affairs of Norway.
The Scandinavian country of Norway His Excellency Amr Moussa minister of foreign affairs of Egypt. The honourable Anthony Lake assistant to the president for national security affairs.
BILL CLINTON US PRESIDENT 1990-2001. Let us salute also today the government of Norway for its remarkable role in nurturing this agreement.
September 1993: Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat shake hands.
Hopes were high that peace between Israelis and Palestinians would finally come to the Middle East.
But two decades on, such a peace remains as elusive as ever. YASSER ABED RABBO PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION.
The Oslo Accord didn't stipulate an end to the occupation that settlements should halt or mention an independent Palestinian state.
RON PUNDAK ISRAELI HISTORIAN. Peres wanted to see a Palestinian state in Gaza and an Israeli, Palestinian, Jordanian condominium in the west bank. [HILDE HENRIKSEN WAAGE NORWEGIAN HISTORIAN.]
It is not possible for a small country like Norway to play an asymmetric role. It has to be a role according to Israel's rules of the game. Present at the signing ceremony was former U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger... chief architect of the peace between Egypt and Israel.
Kissinger's approach was to make only small demands and to build from there.
Arafat picked up on this 'step-by-step' strategy; and as early as 1974, his Palestinian Liberation Organisation approved a plan to aim for a foothold in the region, administered by a Palestinian Authority, rather than historic Palestine. In the same year - the Arab League summit officially designated the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. [YASSER ABED RABBO PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION.]
It is the right of the PLO to lead the Palestinian struggle.
[YASSER ABED RABBO] [PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION] Arafat's approach was to be realistic.
At times it was referred to as 'opportunistic' or 'excessively pragmatic'.
In 1974 Arafat, known to his colleagues as Abu Ammar, addressed the United Nations.
For the Palestinians and for the PLO the event represented recognition for the Palestinian struggle. YASSER ARAFAT CHAIRMAN, PLO 1929-2004.
This is a landmark occasion, bringing the Palestinian cause back to the UN.
The PLO gained stature at the UN. But it continued to reject Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. The resolutions demanded that Israel withdraw within what was called 'secure and recognised borders.'
But they
did not precisely require Israel to withdraw to all land it occupied before the sixth day war in 1967.
HENRY KISSINGER US SECRETARY OF STATE 1973-1977.
As far as the United States is concerned,
any peace negotiations must be based on security council resolutions 242 and 338. We would strongly oppose any attempt to change them.
These two resolutions were the framework for the 1978 Camp David Accords.
The accords called not for a Palestinian state but for what was termed Palestinian 'autonomy'. ABDUL SATTAR QASSEM PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.
In 1977 Begin put forward the idea of Palestinian autonomy with Bethlehem as its capital and a police force armed by Israel. ANIS FAWZI QASIM PALESTINIAN LEGAL ADVISOR.
The Israelis realised that there would come a time when they would have to negotiate with the Palestinians about autonomy.
From its stronghold in south Lebanon in 1977 the PLO decided to explore the possibility of talks with Israel.
[YASSER ABED RABBO] [PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION] For the first time ever we decided to open a dialogue and to meet Israelis.
Abu Ammar and some other PLO leaders strongly supported this.
[1978] Mahmoud Abbas says in his book 'The Secret Channels' that this dialogue was with Israeli forces that supported peace and with the Sephardic Jews. In March 1978 Israel invaded south Lebanon. The United Nations responded by deploying a peacekeeping force into South Lebanon. Known as UNIFIL, part of this force was made up of Norwegian troops. JAN EGELAND NORWEGIAN LABOUR PARTY.
I had visited for the first time as part, as a Norwegian soldier visiting the UNIFIL forces in Lebanon. I came with friends through Israel. Two days later, Norwegian UN troops would enter Israel.
It was hard to work in the areas controlled by the Norwegian Forces as armed Palestinian groups were constantly trying to enter them.
But they didn't succeed. HANS LONGVA NORWEGIAN DIPLOMAT.
Norway contributed approximately 1000 soldiers, and of course the security of those soldiers was a very important concern to us. We were one of the first western countries to establish what we described at the time as working contacts with the PLO in that context.
Minister Knut Frydenlund who was minister of foreign affairs, Thorvald Stoltenberg was the deputy minister, state secretary, he followed the situation very closely at the time.
THORVALD STOLTENBERG FORMER NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER.
No one is afraid of Norway and that's the gift. What makes us weak in the traditional meaning is our strength when it comes to serve the peace.
OMAR KITMITTO PALESTINIAN DIPLOMAT.
Norway was considered a Zionist country.
Out of 157 members of parliament 87 belonged to the group 'The Friends of Israel'.
Norway was the least welcoming country towards Palestinians.
Even more so than the US.
There were people in the government and military willing to help Israel even without any reward.
[HILDE HENRIKSEN WAAGE] [NORWEGIAN HISTORIAN] Norway was more supportive of Israel than many of the others, and I think than any of the other European states, and I think that there are several reasons but one of the most important was that the Norwegian labour party and the Norwegian trade union they saw this state of Israel as a socialist experiment, almost a kind of social democratic, social state, like the one we have in Norway. In the late 70's, there was a common bond of socialist ideology between Norway's Labour party and its namesake in Israel.
One of the key players in this special relationship was a prominent Labour Party member of Norway's Parliament, Johan Jorgen Holst.
[HANS LONGVA] [NORWEGIAN DIPLOMAT] Mr. Holst was the first person at the political level to meet Mr. Arafat. He was deputy minister and state secretary of the ministry of defence. He came to Beirut and travelled on to Israel in July I think it was in 79. He met with Yasser Arafat and Yasser Arafat invited the whole group to a very pleasant dinner. Mr. Holst had very close contact with Israelis and that aspect of Mr. Holst made him even more interesting to Mr. Arafat. Mr. Arafat's interest in Norway was really of its contacts with Israel. JOHAN JORGEN HOLST DEPUTY DEFENCE MINISTER 1976-1979.
It is difficult to find a solutionto the conflict in the Middle East.
AHMED QUREI PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION.
I met Holst by chance when he was the Deputy Defence Minister.
He came to Beirut and visited the Samid Institution.
I was the Director there at the time.
This was while he was visiting the Norwegian troops in southern Lebanon.
In 1979 the Shah of Iran fled into exile. Israel lost an ally and a major oil supplier.
The United States asked Norway to guarantee to sell its North Sea oil to Israel.
Concerned about repercussions for its UN troops in Lebanon, Norway sent its diplomat Hans Longva to seek assurances from Arafat. [HANS LONGVA] [NORWEGIAN DIPLOMAT] Mr. Arafat after reflecting only for a few split seconds, he said I will have no objection to such a Norwegian guarantee to Israel, on one condition, when I need a secret back channel to Israel you provide it.
Yasser Arafat wanted the Norwegians to act as intermediary between himself and Israel. [HILDE HENRIKSEN WAAGE] [NORWEGIAN HISTORIAN] The Norwegians and the Norwegian government were just shocked to hear the message coming back from Arafat, so from 1979 and every year from there onwards the
Norwegians tried to set up a secret back channel between the PLO and Israel, but Israel were absolutely not willing
at all to listen to anything that the Norwegians could come up with from Arafat and the PLO.
In 1982 the PLO lost its base in Lebanon. Palestinian fighters were forced to depart following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon three months earlier. A US-brokered deal led to Arafat and his entourage moving to Tunisia.
[THORVALD STOLTENBERG] [FORMER NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER] It was actually an invitation from Arafat to my predecessor as foreign minister Knut Frydenlund, and myself I have been defence minister and we went in 1982 for New Year's Eve with Arafat in Tunis at that time. Arafat asked us directly if we could help him getting a direct contact between PLO and the Israeli labour party, and I was at that time a member of the assembly of the socialist international, and it turned out to be a strong interest in the socialist international for trying to contribute to normalisation of the relationship between Palestinians and the Israelis. To help with his charm offensive, Arafat turned to senior PLO member Issam Sartawi to act as his main go-between. [THORVALD STOLTENBERG] [FORMER NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER] Arafat appointed Dr. Sartawi. He came here and visited me because I should take care of this from the Norwegian side and I had a very good impression of him. ISSAM SARTAWI PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION 1935-1983. I believe that the PLO has been the greatest achievement of our suffering people.
I believe that the PLO is the most needed [THORVALD STOLTENBERG] [FORMER NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER] And then we should meet in Albufeira. There was the socialist international had its assembly meeting in Albufeira in Portugal, and then
there was some shooting suddenly, we rushed out in the lobby and there was Dr. Sartawi killed, shot down. Issam Sartawi lay where he'd been killed by a lone gunman who pumped 5 shots into his chest. It has never been clearly verified who ordered the assassination of Sartawi.
But the motive appears to be because he was talking to the Israelis on Arafat's behalf. SHIMON PERES ISRAELI LABOUR PARTY LEADER.
Dr. Sartawi took his own position. He did swim against the stream in face of great objection and danger.
Arafat continued a double game. On the one hand seeking discreet diplomatic channels to Israel via the Norwegians. While on the other hand publically maintaining a revolutionary rhetoric. YASSER ARAFAT CHAIRMAN, PLO 1929-2004.
Because we believed in one thing.
That one thing shapes this region's politics: the rifle. [OMAR KITMITTO] [PALESTINIAN DIPLOMAT] Abu Ammar told me: This is a good start. I want you to work quietly with Stoltenberg. He told me that it wouldn't be easy.
He said Stoltenberg still supported Israel and so did his Labour party but our goal was to make them our friends.
The important thing was to give them intelligence.I gave it to the Foreign Ministry after Stoltenberg became Foreign Minister. Twenty years on, Thorvald Stoltenberg will not betray the secrecy of conversations between the PLO and Israel.
[THORVALD STOLTENBERG] [FORMER NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER] We tried to prepare for contact and negotiations between the PLO authorities and the Israeli labour party, we started there, and we would very much like to try to follow up.
[Rawan] Whom were the people from the Israeli labour party that you were contacting? Mr. Shimon Peres or other people?
[THORVALD STOLTENBERG] [FORMER NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER] No, I promised never to tell anyone, I have not told anyone and I'm not even telling you. No, I mean, part of my success in life is not coming from what I say but from all the things I didn't say. In the mid 80s the Labour Party in Israel formed a coalition government with Yitzhak Shamir's Likud Party.
Shamir gave a nod and a wink for Likud member Moshe Amirav to hold secret talks with Palestinian politician Faisal Al Husseini in Jerusalem.
Discussion centred on PLO recognition of Israel, autonomy on the West Bank; and a federal relationship with Jordan. The so-called Amirav-Husseini plan became a model for the subsequent Oslo Accords years later.
But all that was soon dwarfed by the outbreak of the first intifada a Palestinian uprising which took both Israel and the PLO by surprise. Yitzhak Shamir Former Prime Minister.
Stop the riots and let's talk. MUSTAFA BARGHOUTI PALESTINIAN NATIONAL INITIATIVE.
With the first Intifada, the occupying Israelis started to lose.
Israel doesn't accept any kind of loss, economic, human or moral.
AHMAD TIBI MEMBER OF KNESSET.
Once an Israeli feels that someone other than him is cast in the role of victim he loses his mind.
Palestinian boys throwing stones against Israeli tanks. This David and Goliath contest put the Israelis under great pressure. Time was now of the essence. In an exclusive for Al Jazeera, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry has released highly confidential documents that include a 1988, hand-delivered letter from Foreign Minister Stoltenberg to Israel Foreign Minister Peres. Stoltenberg wrote that "Only by relieving itself of the burden of the occupied territories, can Israel succeed and prosper". SHIMON PERES ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER 1986-1988.
I am ready to talk with any Palestinian that will renounce terror that will accept 242 and 338 and recognise Israel. Come and negotiate with us, then you can claim whatever you want. ANIS FAWZI QASIM PALESTINIAN LEGAL ADVISOR.
In 1988 the PLO put ona show around resolution 242.
Yasser Arafat actually wanted to accept 242.
But he didn't know how to sell it to Palestinians. So he said: We now have a state.
He had just created a virtual Palestinian state.
[YASSER ARAFAT] [CHAIRMAN, PLO] [1929-2004] We're establishing a Palestinian state on our Palestinian territories with Jerusalem as its capital.
[ANIS FAWZI QASIM] [PALESTINIAN LEGAL ADVISOR] When the PLO accepted Resolution 242 after fighting against it since it was issued in 1967 in reality it abandoned everything to do with the Palestinian cause.
[YASSER ARAFAT] [CHAIRMAN, PLO] [1929-2004] I accept all United Nations resolutions including 242 and 338, and I accept the international legality and who is against international legality?
[AHMAD TIBI] [MEMBER OF KNESSET] The PLO started to get closer to the international community that had boycotted and confronted it as a terrorist organisation.
Things changed. In 1988 Sweden mediated between the PLO and the United States. A public meeting was held in Stockholm.
[YASSER ARAFAT] [CHAIRMAN, PLO] [1929-2004] The PLO parliament, the Palestinian parliament, the PNC had accepted two states, Palestine state and Jewish state, between brackets Israel. In his speech to the UN General Assembly in Geneva in 1988, Arafat formally condemned terrorism.
[YASSER ABED RABBO] [PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION] Abu Ammar's speech in Geneva was vague. Americans didn't like it.
He didn't directly say: I renounce terrorism.
They asked him to arrange a press conference the following day. As I remember, it was on December 14th, 1988.
They asked him to say clearly, in English: I, in the name of the PLO, renounce terrorism. But Abu Ammar didn't know how to say it. So he started to say: I announce terrorism and the journalists corrected him.
[YASSER ARAFAT] [CHAIRMAN, PLO] [1929-2004] As for terrorism, I announce it Renounce, renounce Yesterday in no uncertain terms, and yet I repeat for the record, I repeat for the record, that we totally and absolutely renounce all forms of terrorism, all forms of terrorism. Arafat had accepted the Israeli terms to start negotiations.
In December 1988, PLO leader Yasser Arafat known to his colleagues as Abu Ammar - publicly renounced violence.
Over the years, Norway had discreetly been talking to the PLO.
With Arafat renouncing violence, Norway was now ready to pay him an official visit at the PLO headquarters in Tunis.
[THORVALD STOLTENBERG] [FORMER NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER] Norwegian [1989] We have a strong relationship with Israel.
We asked the PLO to recognise Israel and renounce terrorism.
This is what Arafat did.
[THORVALD STOLTENBERG] [FORMER NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER] It was the first time a Norwegian foreign minister visited PLO. It was definitely a successful visit because it was a breakthrough for official contacts.
[HILDE HENRIKSEN WAAGE] [NORWEGIAN HISTORIAN] The same foreign minister Thorvald Stoltenberg, the father of the prime minister of Norway today, he went on a mission to Arafat in Tunis in 1989, and at that meeting they had a secret part that no one knew about. The Norwegians worked with Arafat on creating a channel of communication between the PLO and Israel. Far from public scrutiny.
[HANS LONGVA] [NORWEGIAN DIPLOMAT] Mr. Arafat first time he explained how he saw contacts with Israel being established. And the idea of using a Norwegian research institution was the idea of Yasser Arafat which he outlined during that meeting.
[HILDE HENRIKSEN WAAGE] [NORWEGIAN HISTORIAN] They haven't planned or decided which research institute in Norway, but they agreed that that would be a good cover and they also agreed that the Norwegian ministry of foreign affairs should pay for it all. That was also agreed in the document. FAFO was a think tank in Oslo founded by the Trade Unions and connected to Norway's Labour Party.
It was chosen by the Norwegian Foreign Minister as the perfect host for secret talks between Israelis and Palestinians.
Its Director was Terje Rd-Larsen.
He would go on to become a key figure in the negotiations that led to the Oslo Accords.
With funding from the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, in 1989 FAFO started to undertake research in the Middle East.
Its first study examined the living conditions in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. TERJE ROD-LARSEN DIRECTOR OF FAFO.
FAFO conducted this survey in the Palestinian Territories in 1989.
MONA JUUL NORWEGIAN DIPLOMAT.
The living condition of young people growing up under the Intifada. What kind of effect on them, maybe more on the sort of mental psychological effect of growing up in such sort of a violent environment. [Rawan] But then it was more a socio-economic study?
[MONA JUUL] [NORWEGIAN DIPLOMAT] It turned out because that was sort of the speciality of FAFO so it turned up to be a little more socio-economic, unemployment all these kinds of indicators of social economic life. [Rawan] So who were the researchers that worked on this project from Norway?
[MONA JUUL] [NORWEGIAN DIPLOMAT] Ya, there were many, and one of them that sort of was heading that special service was Marianne Heiberg who was the wife of, he wasn't at the time but he later became the Norwegian foreign minister Johan Jrgen Holst. I was working in the sort of what we call the foreign minister's cabinet or the secretariat, my husband was with FAFO, Jan Egeland was the state secretary.
[JAN EGELAND] [NORWEGIAN LABOUR PARTY] Mona Juul and I had studied political science in the university. We had been skiing together. We had been to university camps together. And her husband Terje Rd-Larsen I also knew from his work as an academic and his work in creation of FAFO the trade union think-tank. So these were my friends already when I became the deputy of Thorvald Stoltenberg in the ministry of foreign affairs.
[HILDE HENRIKSEN WAAGE] [NORWEGIAN HISTORIAN] It's often difficult for foreigners to understand that Norway is a very, very small country, and the Labour party has ruled Norway for most of the post war period, so you have connections. You are almost families married together within the Labour party, like almost we sometimes call it the royal labour party because they are like a dynasty. This dynasty was very tight-knit.
Foreign Minister Stoltenberg appointed Jan Egeland as his deputy and Mona Juul as Egelande's Secretary. She was married to Terje Rd-Larsen, the Director of FAFO. Stoltenberg's sister-in-law was Marianne Heiberg who worked in FAFO. She was married to Defence Minister Johan Jrgen Holst. This made Holst and the Foreign Minister Stoltenberg brothers-in-law. Holst himself later became Norway's Foreign Minister. This extended political family became the Norwegian team in the secret Israeli-PLO talks. ARNE ORUM NORWEGIAN RESEARCHER.
They could use that research institution as a front for diplomatic effort to facilitate peace talks between the two parties and do that in all secrecy. [Rawan] You are very critical about this, why?
[ARNE ORUM] [NORWEGIAN RESEARCHER] I think researchers should not usually be, take on two hats or be in double roles. In Tel Aviv, another research institute was also acting as a cover for communication between Israelis and the Palestinians. This was the Economic Cooperation Foundation set up by Israeli Labour Party MP Yossi Beilin.
[RON PUNDAK] [ISRAELI HISTORIAN] The NGO that we were leading, Hirschfeld and myself. An NGO which was created earlier by Beilin and Hirschfeld. We were able to go between the two sides in Jerusalem and pass messages and come with ideas and even bring the two sides unofficially together under our umbrella of an NGO. YOSSI BEILIN ISRAELI LABOUR PARTY.
I was involved with talking to the Palestinian side for many years in a very informal way mainly with people like Hanan Ashrawi and Faisal Husseini from east Jerusalem with whom it was easy to talk. By 1989, with the Palestinian intifada in its second year, there were few signs of hope for peace. Hundreds of Palestinians had been killed and thousands detained. The United States - under President George Bush started to increase the pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir.
[YITZHAK SHAMIR] [ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER ] [1986-1992] The peace process will be composed of two stages. First stage will be interim conditions, and this will include a full autonomy etcetera. The second stage will be direct negotiations without any preconditions between Israel, the Palestinian Arabs and some Arab countries if they will join the negotiations.
[YITZHAK SHAMIR] [ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER] [1986-1992] We are ready to embark immediately on peace talks, for that purpose we are ready to hold elections in the administered territories that will produce a democratically chosen representative leadership of the Palestinians. Everything changed in the region when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. The United States led a coalition of nations that retaliated against Iraqi forces. GEORGE BUSH US PRESIDENT 1989-1993.
[1991] Just two hours ago, allied air forces began an attack on military targets in Iraq and Kuwait. These attacks continue as I speak. Arafat rejected a military solution to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. This proved a costly decision.
[HANS LONGVA] [NORWEGIAN DIPLOMAT] Before the Gulf war, PLO received big financial support from the Arab gulf states. After the war because of Yasser Arafat's support to Saddam Hussein that financial support disappeared. They came out of that war very weakened. And I think frankly that was also one of the reasons why the Israelis were more interested in discussing with them after the Gulf war than before. We of course have close relations with the United States of America. They are an ally, they are a friend, and we made no secret of the contacts with the PLO obviously and we shared some of our assessment based on our communication with PLO with our American friends, yes.
In the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War the United States and the Soviet Union co-hosted a peace conference in the Spanish capital of Madrid. JAMES BAKER US SECRETARY OF STATE 1989-1992.
We have an opportunity, I think a real opportunity to see Arabs, Arab states sitting down face to face in direct negotiations with Israel.
[ANIS FAWZI QASIM] [PALESTINIAN LEGAL ADVISOR] All the conditions for Madrid were drafted by Shamir and the Israeli government and they vetoed PLO representation.
The delegation had to come from the occupied Palestinian territories.
[YASSER ABED RABBO] [PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION] Arafat fought strongly against the Israeli conditions but lost.
Some Arab states didn't want us at Madrid, preferring to isolate us.
Others suggested we accept the conditions to get a foot in the door.
We agreed to take part but through a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.
MAHMOUD ABBAS PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION.
[1991] Our number one priority is to be at the Madrid conference. The Israelis laid out a fixed negotiating position.
[YITZHAK SHAMIR] [ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER] [1986-1992] We are the only people who have lived in the land of Israel without interruption for nearly 4000 years. Haidar Abdel-Shafi led the Palestinians within the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation at the talks. HAIDER ABDEL-SHAFI PALESTINIAN DELEGATE.
Palestinian Jerusalem, the capital of our homeland and future state, defines Palestinian existence, past, present and future. The settlements must stop now, territory for peace is a travesty when territory for illegal settlement is official Israeli policy and practice.
The three-day conference ended with plans for further bilateral and multilateral negotiations between Israel and the Arabs. Documents released after the conference reveal that Shamir thought Madrid a success; and that James Baker said that the US did not support an independent Palestinian state.
[ANIS FAWZI QASIM] [PALESTINIAN LEGAL ADVISOR] It was clear from the way the Israelis behaved that the talks could last 20 years.
They just didn't seem to care. Israelis who celebrated the end of Hanukkah in Washington arrived 5 days late. An attempt to make it clear to the United States that they are here on their own terms and won't respond to pressure. After Madrid, negotiations moved to Washington DC. ELYAKIM RUBINSTEIN ISRAELI DELEGATION.
We sincerely feel that our ideas are fully in conformity with the framework of this process, as it was laid ahead and we speak with a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. ABDELSALAM AL MAJALI JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN DELEGATION.
Hello, good evening everybody, we met like we met in the morning, the heads of delegations. We discussed the matter of procedures, and we could not reach yet an agreement.
[HAIDER ABDEL-SHAFI] [PALESTINIAN DELEGATE] The Israeli government shifted unabashed to the intransigent and openly declared position of claiming all Palestinian territory, not conceding anything for the Palestinians and refusing to recognise their unity, the unity of the Palestinians inside and outside.
[ANIS FAWZI QASIM] [PALESTINIAN LEGAL ADVISOR] The problem that completely preoccupied Haidar Abdel-Shafi at all our formal and informal talks was the Israeli settlements.
[HILDE HENRIKSEN WAAGE] [NORWEGIAN HISTORIAN] And the Israelis, they were more and more angry about this very old calm distinguished man talking about settlements. He said how can we have back Palestine if it's settlements all over, so he had a much more, and the delegation there, had a much more straight forward approach to peace. For the Palestinians, negotiator Haidar Abdel Shafi kept the focus of his agenda on one burning issue: the illegal Israeli settlement construction in the occupied Palestinian territories. By 1991 the number of Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip exceeded 100,000.
[MAHMOUD ABBAS] [PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION] There's no doubt that the settlements are crucial for the peace process.
By continuing to build what we think are illegal settlements Israel suggests that it doesn't want peace.
[MUSTAFA BARGHOUTI] [PALESTINIAN NATIONAL INITIATIVE] With the talks at stalemate, Israel decided to look for a different route.
[RON PUNDAK] [ISRAELI HISTORIAN] I would say one of the most important messages that we got in our almost daily contacts with Ashrawi and Husseini and Nuseibah and Ziad, all the Palestinian leaders, if PLO will not be involved, there won't be any progress, and more so Ashrawi and Husseini told us very clear.
[Rawan] Hanan Ashrawi and Faisal Husseini [RON PUNDAK] [ISRAELI HISTORIAN] Hanan Ashrawi and Faisal Husseini, they told us something very very clear. If you would like to have an agreement with the Palestinians, partner who can make concessions, there's only one address and that's the PLO. FAISAL AL HUSSEINI PALESTINIAN POLITICIAN.
If the Israelis would like to negotiate with the Palestinians so they must negotiate with the representative of the Palestinians. The representative of the Palestinians is the PLO.
HANAN ASHRAWI PALESTINIAN POLITICAN. If they disqualify the PLO then they're not going to have any Palestinian to talk to.
[YASSER ABED RABBO] [PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION] The Washington talks were going nowhere. Delegations came and went but nothing was agreed.
So if we started separate secret negotiations with the Israelis we'd have nothing to lose because it wouldn't ultimately be binding. The PLO again approached Norway to open a new and secret channel with the Israelis. In February of 1992, senior PLO official Ahmed Qurei known as Abu Ala'a - travelled to Oslo. [OMAR KITMITTO] [PALESTINIAN DIPLOMAT] Abu Ala'a was in Sweden and we went to the Foreign Ministry to meet them.
[Rawan] Who did you meet at the Foreign Ministry?
We met Stoltenberg, the Norwegian Foreign Minister and I remember Jan Egeland was there.
[JAN EGELAND] [NORWEGIAN LABOUR PARTY] PLO starts to send signals to us here, Abu Ala' comes that we Norway could become their link to Israel if Israel was interested. Then came Basem Abu Sharif and he was even more explicit and said: I am talking directly, I have a message straight from the top, Yasser Arafat, Norway should try to do this. And it has to be directly linked with PLO Tunis leadership only.
The minutes of their secret meeting in Oslo reveal that Bassam Abu Sharif told the Norwegians that if there were peace, "the PLO would influence the Arab World to stop the boycott of Israel". [JAN EGELAND] [NORWEGIAN LABOUR PARTY] Of course it takes two to Tango; we did not have the Israeli side. I had met Yitzhak Rabin before he was elected, on one of my missions to Israel.
[Rawan] On April 1992 [JAN EGELAND] [NORWEGIAN LABOUR PARTY] In April 92, we met Rabin. He came for a breakfast in the Norwegian embassy and we asked him what is your approach to the Palestinians, and he said I'm keen to see some kind of a negotiated settlement. In 1992, the Israeli Labour Party led by Yitzhak Rabin won the general election. Rabin continued Israel's policy of settlement building. In public, he spoke optimistically of progress in the peace negotiations.
[YITZHAK RABIN ] [ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER ] [1992-1995] I believe that within six to nine months, it will be possible to reach an agreement with the Palestinian delegation about the establishment of autonomy. What will be the first and most important task for a government for you and your colleagues?
[SHIMON PERES] [ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER] [1992-1995] To renew the peace process and go straight ahead into the autonomy implementation. Shimon Peres was appointed Foreign Minister. Yossi Beilin here on the left - was appointed his Deputy; and Uri Savir on the right their General Manager. Beilin was given the green light to start the secret direct negotiations with the PLO in Norway.
[YOSSI BEILIN] [ISRAELI LABOUR PARTY] The point of Norway was because Norway was out of the EU, it had independent foreign policy. We had meetings with Terje Rd-Larsen, with his people. TERJE ROD-LARSEN PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL PEACE INSTITUTE. , We had many many meetings but very little came out of it. But then I started to understand much better the mind set of both parties.
RON PUNDAK
ISRAELI HISTORIAN
Beilin actually told the Norwegians that it's good that they will make contact with Hirschfeld, later I joined, in order to facilitate. In order to, that you'll have two NGOs, two non-governmental dialogue. This was the, and we met, Hirschfeld met Larsen before. I met him April and later. We found a brother in a way. A man who thinks very similar to our way of thinking. His wife was the head of the office of the minister’s deputy, and second is the minister and the deputy were very close friends of Larsen. All of them from the labour party. Old friends.
YOSSI BEILIN
ISRAELI LABOUR PARTY
Mr. Stoltenberg was the foreign minister. I knew him very well and he was very very enthusiastic about the process.
HANS LONGVA
NORWEGIAN DIPLOMAT
Mr. Stoltenberg met Shimon Peres, was the minister of ...airs of Israel in New York at the opening of the general assembly in September, and on the basis of those contacts, the follow up contacts, Thorvald Stoltenberg assessment was that the time was right to follow up the suggestion of Mr. Arafat.
ARNE ORUM
NORWEGIAN RESEARCHER
The PLO and Arafat were exactly
weak enough, so this was exactly the time that the Israelis should chose to start negotiating with PLO outside.
RON PUNDAK
ISRAELI HISTORIAN
PLO before Oslo was almost dead.
HILDE HENRIKSEN WAAGE
NORWEGIAN HISTORIAN
Israel was the strong power. And Israel decided who to talk to, when to talk, the terms of the negotiations. They told Norway that Norway could like it or dislike it. They could do as Israel say or go home.
COMM
A new and self-confident Israeli government...
...and a PLO still cast as outsiders by the world community.
They were now on the secret road to the Oslo Accords...